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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DR. R. B. LINDSAY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.- Case No. 8492 
JENNIE WOODWARD, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
This is an appeal by tTennie Woodward from a 
Summary Judgment entered against her by the Third 
District Court of Salt Lake County, dismissing her 
Amended Counterclaim to the Complaint of Dr. R. B. 
Lindsay, who brought suit against her to recover the 
reasonable value of medical services. The appeal evolved 
from these facts : 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 8, 1952, Jennie Woodward, defendant and 
appellant, herein referred to as defendant, was injured 
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2 
in an .automobile accident at Cokeville, Wyoming. De 
fend.ant's sister telephoned plaintiff and respondent, Dr. 
R. B. Lindsay, herein referred to as plaintiff, at Mont-
' pelier, Idaho, to secure medical treatrnent for defendant. 
Plaintiff immediately drove to Cokeville, a distancr 
of some 32 miles and examined defendant, whereupon 
defendant was taken to the Bear L.ake Memorial Hos-
pital in Montpelier. 
Defendant was attended by plaintiff during her hos-
pitalization, which lasted approximately one month (De-
position, p. 32). On .July 29, 1952, a brace applied by 
plaintiff was removed. This was the last time defendant 
was treated by plaintiff (Deposition, p. 43). 
In August of 1952, defendant consulted an attorney 
to represent her in asserting a clailn for personal in-
juries against the driver pf the other automobile involved 
in the accident (Deposition, p. 62). Later defendant filed 
suit in Wyoming. 
By her Amended Petition in the \\~yoming suit filed 
May 29, 1953, defendant sought reeoYery of $27,405.31 
as damages for the following injuries: fracture of left 
clavicle; fracture of fourth, fifth, and sixth ribs, left 
side; fracture of seventh and eight yertebra; severe 
trauma and spraining of the pelYis articulation .and junc-
tions; severe trauma of the thoracic visera and severe 
traumatic pleurisy; arthritis of left shoulder and arm, 
right shoulder and neck, lower back and both legs, and 
pain and shock (R. 17, 19). 
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It was alleged that these injuries were permanent 
(R. 17). Defendant also sought certain special damages, 
including amount of plaintiff's bill for professional ser-
vices, that of Dr. Paul, Salt L~ke City, that of Dr. H. 
K. Rock, Kemmerer, Wyoming, and including travel 
expense to Salt Lake City, Utah, for an examination by 
Dr. L. N. Ossman (R. 21). 
On August 27, 1954, the Wyoming suit was settled. 
Defendant executed a release of all claims and judg-
ment of dismissal with prejudice and on the merits was 
entered by the Court pursuant to stipulation (R. 22). 
On August 17, 1955, plaintiff filed the instant suit 
against defendant to recover $225.00, for medical ser-
vices rendered (R. 1). This suit was filed in the City 
Court of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah, de-
fendant having by this time taken up residence in Salt 
Lake City. Defendant m.ade no appearance in this case 
and judgment by default was entered on September 7, 
1955 for the relief dernanded in the complaint (R. 2). 
Defendant filed notice of appeal on October 1, 1955, 
and after the appeal was taken and the cause transferred 
to the District Court of S.alt Lake County, and as a part 
of the appellate proceedings, defendant filed a counter-
claim seeking recovery of damages in the amount of 
$40,000.00 for alleged malpractice (R. 4, 5). 
Plaintiff nwved to dismiss this counterclaim upon 
the ground, arnong others, that the relief demanded ex-
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ceeded the jurisdiction of the City Court and hence ex-
ceeded the appellate jurisdiction of the District Court 
(R. 6). 
This motion w.as denied on December 5, 1955, and 
on December 19, 1955, plaintiff filed a l\1otion for Sum-
mary Judgn1ent with attached Affidavit, setting up the 
release and the applicable statute of limitations. In order 
to protect the record, plaintiff also included the ground 
of excess of jurisdiction, plaintiff feeling that it was 
necessary under Utah decisions to .assert this defense at 
every stage of the proceedings. This latter ground was 
not argued, however, it being explained to the Court 
by counsel for plaintiff that a ruling had previouusly 
been made upon this particular defense (R. 12, 22). 
After argu1nent, Judge Ray Yan Cott, Jr. granted 
plaintiff's Motion for Su1n1nary Judgment (R. 23, 2-±). 
This appeal followed. 
STATE1fENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE CLAIM SET FORTH IN DEFENDANT'S AMENDED 
COUNTERCLAIM IS BARRED BY HER RELEASE AND 
THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL IN THE WYOMING A·C-
TION. 
POINT II. 
THE CLAIM SET FORTH IN DEFENDANT'S AMEND-
ED COUNTERCLAIM IS BARRED BY LIMITATION. 
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POINT III. 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER 
DEFENDANT'S AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM BE•CAUSE 
THE COUNTERCLAIM EXCEEDED THE JURISDICTION 
OF THE CITY COURT OF SALT LAKE •CITY, AND THERE-
FORE EXCEEDED THE JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT ON APPEAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE CLAIM SET FORTH IN DEFENDANT'S AMENDED 
COUNTERCLAIM IS BARRED BY HER RELEASE AND 
THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL IN THE WYOMING AC-
TION. 
The release executed by defendant in this case was 
apparently executed in Wyoming, and under general 
principles of Conflict of Laws, the effect of the release 
would be governed by the law of Wyoming, 76 C.J.S. 
671 (Release, Sec. 39). Our research, however, has failed 
to reveal .any Wyoming decisions applicable to the facts 
of this case. We, of necessity, therefore, have directed 
our research to decisions of other jurisdictions. 
By the great weight of authority, a general release 
executed in favor of one responsible for the plaintiff'~ 
original injury, is a bar to an action against a physician 
for damages incurred by his negligent treatment of that 
injury. 40 A.L.R. (2d) 1075 (Release of One Responsible 
for Injury as Affec6ng Liability of Physician or Sur-
geon for Negligent Treatment of Injury). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
A decision illustrating this well settled principle 
is Thompso.n v. Fox, 326 Pa. 209, 192 A. 107, 112 A.L.R. 
550 (1937). In that case plaintiff was struck by an auto-
roo bile on November 21, 1932, and as a result suffered 
injuries, the most serious of which was a fracture of 
the neck of the right femur. He was immediately at-
tended by defendant, a practicing physician, and re-
mained under his care until11ay 1933. In October, 1933, 
plaintiff brought suit ag.ainst the driver to recover 
damages for injuries sustained as a result of the ac-
cident, including the fracture of the hip, which he alleged 
left him permanently lame and crippled. 
On July 25, 1934, plaintiff settled the suit and re-
leased the responsible party " ... of and frmn all, and all 
manner, of actions and causes of action ... clainis and 
demands whatsoever ... " arising out of the accident. 
On 1farch 4, 1935, plaintiff brought this suit, alleging 
that defendant carelessly and ilnproperly treated the 
fracture and did not set it in accordance "ith surgical 
and medical s,tandards. A.t the trial of this suit, the 
court directed a verdict for defendant. Plaintiff ap-
pealed. The Pennsylvania Supre1ne Court said: 
"There is apparently no case in this state di-
rectly in point, but the detennining principles of 
law are as well established in PPnnsYlYania as else-
where. Other jurisdictions have held. with almost 
cmnplete nnanimih-. that there can be no recoverv 
in such a suit ag~~in~t a physician for neglige~t 
aggrav.ation of injuries. after a settle1nent ef-
fected with the tort-feasor who caused the acci-
dent. (Cases cited.) 
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"In the action against Taylor, plaintiff's re-
covery for the injury to his hip would have in-
cluded the added damage caused by the alleged 
negligence of defendant. Doctors, being human, 
.are apt occasionally to lapse from prescribed 
standards, and the likelihood of carelessness, lack 
of judgment or of skill, on the part of one em-
ployed to effect the cure of a condition caused 
by another's act, is therefore considered in law 
as an incident of the original injury, and if the 
injured party has used ordinary care in the selec-
tion of .a physician or surgeon, any additional 
harm resulting from the latter's mistake or negli-
gence is considered as one of the elements of the 
damages for which the original wrongdoer is li-
able. (Cases cited. Citing also Sec. 457 of the · 
Restatement of the law of Torts.) 
"Such being the law, for the final condition 
of his hip plaintiff could have sued, and did sue, 
Taylor; for the aggravation of the original con-
dition plaintiff could have sued, and did sue, de-
fendant. He could have pursued both actions to 
judgment. For ·the same injury, however, an in-
jured party c.an have but one satisfaction and 
the receipt of such satisfaction, either as pay-
ment of a judgment recovered or consideration for 
a release executed by him, from a person liable 
for such injury, necessarily works a release of 
all others liable for the same injury and pre-
vents any further proceedings .against them 
(Case~ cited.) This is true even though it was 
intended, or the release expressly stipula;ted that 
the other wrongdoers should not thereby be re-
leased. (Cases cited.) Nor is it materia! whether 
the tort-feasors involved committed a "joint tort 
of concurrent or successive torts, because the 
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principle which underlies the rule is that the 
injured party is given a legal remedy only 
to obtain compensation for the damage done 
to him, and when that compensation has been re-
ceived from any of the wrongdoers, his right to 
further remedy is at an end. Of course, if a tort-
feasor is liable only for a part of the damage, and 
another tort-feasor is liable only for another part 
. . . a release of one does not release the other; 
but where both are liable for the same damage, 
nor matter upon what theory their respective lia-
bilities are predicated, the rule applies. Since 
plaintiff, by settling with Taylor, was compen-
sated for all injuries, both those originally and 
those ultimately arising out of the accident, in-
cluding the aggravation of the hip condition by 
defendant's alleged negligence, he cannot obtain 
from defendant a second satisfaction for the same 
damage." 
The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. 
See also Phillips v. W erndorff, 215 Ia. 521, 2±3 N. \V. 
525 (1932) where the Supreme Court of Iowa observed: 
"The receipt was clearly designed to release 
the original wrongdoer frmn all and every claim 
of every kind against then1. This necessarily in-
cluded the aggravation of the original injury by 
the .alleged unskillful and negligent treatment 
thereof by Appellee." 
Other cases illustrating this rule are: Be11esh r. Gar-
vais, 221 Minn. 1, 20 N. \V. (2d) 532 (19±5): Sams v. 
Curfman, et al (Colorado, 1943) 137 P. (~d) 1017. 
Additional cases are cited in the annotation pre-
viously referred to found at 40 A.L.R. (2d) 1075, and in 
' 
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the Note at 39 N.C.C.A. 558, entitled, "Disease or Ag-
grav.ation of Injury Due to Malpractice of Physician At-
tending Injured Person as Element of Damages Re-
coverable from Original Tort Feasor," and particularly 
Part II thereof entitled, "Settlement with Original Tort 
Feasor as Releasing Physician." 
Defendant, apparently conceding that her appeal is 
without merit under the rule adopted by the majority 
of the courts, urges that this court apply the rule which 
defendant asser,ts is applied in California. Two Cal-
ifornia decisions are cited - Ash v. Mortenson, 24 Cal. 
(2d) 654, 150 P. (2d) 876 (1944) and Dickow v. Cooking-
ham 123 Cal. App. (2d) 81, 266 P. (2d) 63 (1954). 
The view taken in these cases is perhaps best illus-
tr·ated by this excerpt from Ash v. Mortenson: 
"We are of the opinion that a release of the 
original wrongdoer should release an attending 
doctor from liability for aggravation of the injury 
if there has been full compensation for both in-
juries, but not otherwise." 
While the facts in those cases may easily be dis-
tinguished from those of the instant case, the rationale 
of those decisions would appear to require inquiry into 
the extent of the claim asserted in the first suit as con-
trasted with that asserted in the subsequent suit. This, 
of course, is the only way it can be determined whether 
compensation was received for a particular injury. See 
Wheat v. Carter, 79 N.H. 150, 106 A. 602 (1919), cited 
by defendant. 
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Even if this approach be taken, however, the undis-
puted facts compel the conclusion· reached by the trial 
court. Here defendant makes no claim which was not 
asserted by her in the previous suit, as appears from 
the following tabulation: 
Present Action I Prior Action 
" ... permanently injur-
ed in her health and con- " permanently in-
stitution and suffered and jured ... (R. 17) 
continues to suffer great " ... great and intense 
pain." (R. 10) pain ... " (R. 19) 
" fracture of the 
" ... permanent injury body of the seventh and 
to her back ... " (R. 10) eighth vertebra ... " (R. 
17) 
" shoulder " 
I 
" left clavicle was 
(R. 10) fracturc:d . . . " (R. 17) 
I 
" . . upper portion of 
" ... legs ... " (R. 10) both legs ... " (R. 17) 
" severe injury to .. 
" . body ... (R. 10) said Mary Jane Woodward .. 
. .. " (R. 17) 
H 
... hips ... " (R. 10) I 
" . . . pelvis articulation 
and junctions ... " (R. 17) 
" mind and entire " severe and pro· 
nervous system . . . " (R. found shock to her nervous 
10). system ... " (R. 19) 
" ... crippled ... "(R. 
I 
" Arthritic condi-
10) tions ... " (R. 17) 
In response to questions about her present com-
plaints, defendant n1ade these answers in her deposition: 
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"Q. 1-I.ave you had these complaints which 
you have at this time since the accident~ 
"A. Yes. 
* * * 
"Q. In general, do you have the same com-
plaints now that you had after the accident' 
"A. Oh sure, only that the condition is-it 
isn't getting any better, see, it is just getting 
worse. 
* * :t: 
"Q. . .. And did you tell your attorney what 
injuries you had at that time' 
"A. Yes, and the attorney knows because 
he has the medical reports from four doctors. 
"Q. And did you tell him about the same 
complaints that you have told us about here to-
day' 
"A. Yes sure. 
"Q. And he had talked to these four doctors 
you say' 
"A. He has the medical reports from the 
four doctors. 
"Q. And did he sue for those injuries which 
you have described here today~ 
"A. Yes. 
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"Q. And did you bring that suit against l\1:r. 
Olsen who was driving the other car~ 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And then you settled that law suit did 
you not~ 
"A. Yes. 
(See deposition, pp 61-3) 
The release executed by the defendant in settlement 
of that action provided as follows : 
"FOR THE SOLE CONSIDERATION OF 
Fifty-seven Hundred fifty Dollars, the receipt and 
sufficiency whereof is hereby acknowledged the 
undersigned hereby releases and forever dis-
charges L. K. Olson and State F.arm l\futual Auto-
mobile Insurance Co., their heirs, executors, ad-
ministrators, agents and assigns, and all other 
persons, finns or corporations liable, or who 
might be claimed to be liable, none of whom admit 
any liability to the undersigned but all expressly 
deny any liability frmn any and all claims, de-
mands, damages, actions, causes of action or suits 
of any kind or nature whatsoever, and particular-
ly on account of all injuries, known and unknown, 
both to persons or property, 'vhich have resulted 
or may, in the future develop from an accident 
which occurred on or .about the 8th day of June, 
1952 at or near Cokeville, 'Yymning. 
"Undersigned hereby declares that the terms 
of this settlement have been con1pletely read and 
are fully understood and voluntarily accepted for 
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the purpose of rnaking a full and final compromise 
adjustment and settlement of any and all claims, 
disputed or otherwise, on account of the injuries 
and damages above mentioned. 
"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereun-
to set my hand and seal this 27th day of August, 
1954. 
jsj Mary Jane Woodward (SEAL) 
In Presence of 
jsj E. J. Herschler" 
(See copy between R. 21 and R. 22). 
Even though the release specifically includes un-
known injuries, defendant attempts to avoid the effect 
of this release by contending that she did not know until 
years after the settlement that her hip was injured 
(Brief, page 7). Defendant makes reference to page 48, 
line 10 of her deposition to support this assertion. The 
statement made on page 48 at line 10 is: 
"And now I found out that this socket, this 
hip socket was knocked out (indicating), and that 
constant three and a half years' motion has worn 
that right thin. " 
On page 18 of her deposition, however, defendant 
testifies as follows : 
"Q. Did you have any specific pains other 
than the one in your shoulder and the one in your 
back, on that occasion (the first afternoon or 
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evening following the accident), do you recall~ 
"A. Well, down through my hips, but as 
e.ach day went on, see, they got worse. 
"Q. You had pain in your hips~ 
"A. Yes and I still do.'' 
Also, reference to hip injuries is made in the 
amended petition where complaint is made of injury to 
the pelvis articulation and junctions (R. 17). 
Defendant also seeks to avoid the release upon the 
ground that "separate torts" where committed by the 
defendant (Brief, page 8). In her deposition, however, 
defendant complained only of the following against the 
plaintiff: alleged failure to take X-rays, failure to fix 
her fractured shoulder, failure to treat the injury to her 
pelvis, hips and back, and failure to build up her general 
physical condition (Deposition, pages 65-67). There 1~ 
no assertion that the alleged conduct of the pl.aintiff did 
any more than aggravate an original injury. 
Contrast the undisputed evidence in this case with 
the facts in Mainfort v. Gianuestras, 49 Ohio Ops. -±±0, 
111 D. E. (2d) 692 (1951), relied upon by defendant a& 
authority for her "sep,arate tort" theory. In that case 
plaintiff's leg was shortened 1lh inches as a result of 
an accident. Plaintiff executed a release of all claims. 
Thereafter plaintiff en1ployed defendant to lengthen his 
leg. When the result of this operation was unsatisfac-
tory, plaintiff sued for malpractice. 
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Defendant demurred on the ground that plaintiff 
had signed a general release. 
Plaintiff contended the rule holding a release of the 
original wrongdoer discharges the physician applied only 
to negligence of physician occurring prior to the release. 
It was held, however, that the rule was not so limited. 
F.ar from supporting defendant, the language from 
this case, quoted at page 8 of her brief, is fatal to her 
position when the facts of the case are considered. 
Defendant also relies upon Corbet v. Clark, 187 Va. 
222, 46 S. E. (2d) 327 (1948) to support this theory. 
Even a cursory examination of the facts there involved 
points up the very weakness of defendant's argument in 
this c.ase. There one dentist left the root of a tooth in 
plaintiff's gum. A second dentist was alleged to have 
been negligent in extracting a different tooth and release 
of the first dentist was held not to discharge the second. 
It is obvious that the second dentist was not employed 
to treat plaintiff for injuries resulting from the negli-
gence of the first and hence the question here involved 
and the rule generally recognized does not even come 
into operation. 
Defendant also now claims that a separate tort was 
committed by plaintiff in "fraudulent misrepresentation 
and concealment" (Brief, page 9). At no time, however, 
is it explained how such could have in any way caused 
the damages of which defendant complains. The most 
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alleged is that plaintiff Inisrepresented the true condi-
tion of defendant and induced her to refrain from con-
sulting other physicians, that she might learn the true 
condition proximately caused by the negligence and mal-
practice of plaintiff (R. 10). As a matter of fact, how-
ever, it is undisputed that defendant was examined by 
four medical doctors prior to settling her action (page 
63). She has seen none additional since. (R. 2.1, Deposi-
tion, pp, 63, 71, 73), and she admits these doctors told her 
she had a permanent disability. (Dep. pp 50, 54). 
By way of final attempt to avoid application of the 
almost universal rule previously stated, defendant sug-
gests that her cause of action against plaintiff really is 
for breach of contract. Courts have long ago learned to 
perceive the difference between the form and the sub-
stance of an action. A similar argument was made and 
rejected in Sams v. Curfmann, et al., (Colorado, 1943) 
137 P. (2d) 1017. However designated, what defendant 
actually complains of in this case is alleged negligence 
upon the part of plaintiff. 
Under this "contract" theory defendant refers to 
Van Blumenthal v. Cassola et al., (Sup. Ct. of N. Y., 
1938), 3 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 246, erroneously cited by de-
fendant as Bur v. BZ.umenthal 2 N.Y. Supp. 246. While 
its holding is somewhat difficult to perceive, it appears 
contra to the decision of the N.Y. Court of Appeals in 
Milks et al v. Mciver et al., 264 N.Y. 267, 190 N. E. 487 
(1936) In any event, defendant does not claim plaintiff 
contracted to produce a complete recovery from plain-
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tiff's injuries, as in the Cassola case where the breach 
consisted in permitting the p.atient to die. 
This Court's attention should perhaps be directed 
to the fact that defendant repeatedly refers to the al-
legations of her counterclaim as facts. Such is not the 
rule, however, on motions for summary judgment. 
Schess.ler v. Keck, (Calif., 1956) 292 P. (2d) 314. 
In summary, whether the rule followed in the 
majority of jurisdictions be adopted, or the "minority 
rule", it is without dispute that defendant now complains 
against plaintiff for the same injuries she complained 
of in the prior suit, which suit was fully settled and 
satisfied. This settlement was made two years after 
all treatment by plaintiff had terminated - after she 
had consulted an attorney - after she had been examined 
by four doctors. And, significantly, only after judgment 
by default had been entered against her for the value 
of the services performed by plaintiff, was a counter-
claim asserted. 
POINT II. 
THE CLAIM SET FORTH IN DEFENDANT'S AMEND-
ED COUNTERCLAIM IS BARRED BY LIMITATION. 
Section 78-12-45, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro-
vides: 
"When a cause of action has arisen in another 
state or territory, or in a foreign country, and 
by the laws thereof an action thereon cannot there 
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be maintained against a person by reason of the 
lapse of time, an action thereon shall not be main-
tained against him in this state, except in favor 
of one who has been a citizen of this state and 
who had held the cause of action from the time 
it accrued." 
The claim which defendant now asserts in her 
Arnended Counterclaim arose in the State of Idaho, since 
that is where Plaintiff's allegedly improper professional 
services were performed. The statutes of the State of 
Idaho provide that an action for personal injuries is 
barred unless the same is instituted within two years 
after the date the cause of action accrued (R. 15). 
It is undisputed that no services of any kind were 
performed by plaintiff after July 29, 1952 (Deposition, 
p. 43). It is also undisputed that defendant was not 
a citizen of the State of Utah at the time this cause of 
action accrued (Dep. pp. 47, 48). 
It would seem to follow, without citation of authority, 
that the cause of action set forth in the An1ended Coun-
terclaim of defendant is barred by limitation. 
To escape this obvious conclusion, defendant claims 
that plaintiff concealed the true nature of her injuries 
and misrepresented her condition so that she did not 
discover the true facts until N ove1nber, 1955. She ap-
parently relies upon Peteler v. Robinson, 81 Utah 535, 
17 P. (2d) 244 (1932). 
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In the Peteler case, however, it was specifically 
pointed out that the plaintiff was treated to and includ-
ing October 22, 1926, long after the alleged negligent act 
occurred. The action was commenced January 24, 1927. 
In this case the full term of the statute of limitations 
ran between the date of the final treatment given de-
fendant by plaintiff. 'rhere was no continuing negligence 
and conce.alment, as alleged in the Peteler case. 
Nevertheless, it would seem material, in determin-
ing whether or not the action was barred in Idaho, to 
make examination of Idaho decisions. A decision striking-
ly to similar to this case is Trimming v. Howard, (Idaho, 
1932) 16 P. (2d) 661. In that case the plaintiff sued for 
damages arising when he employed the defendant physi-
cian to treat him for spinal meningitis. Plaintiff alleged 
that defendant attempted to inject into his spinal column 
a certain serum by means of a hypodermic syringe, but 
that he broke off a portion of the needle in his back; that 
he failed in his contractual duty to skillfully and care-
fully treat the plaintiff and to remove the needle, and 
that the physician knowingly and falsely represented 
that the needle had been removed and that plaintiff did 
not discover the falsity of this representation until June 
25, 1930. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence .a 
non-suit was entered on the ground that the action was 
barred by the statute of limitations. 
The Supreme Court of Idaho said that the action 
was one arising out of a tort rather than contract .and 
that the cause of action was nothing but malpractice, 
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which is negligence. The Court commented that the ap-
propriate statute of limitations is determined by the 
substance, not the form of the achon, and that as such 
the two year limitation period applies. 
As to the claim of fraud, the court held that this 
was not in substance an action for fraud, and that since 
the wrong arose not from the fraud, but from the neg-
ligence, it could not be governed by the fraud statute of 
limitations. The Court observed that the cause of action 
arose on July 4, 1926, when the broken needle was left 
in plaintiff's back and since two years and eleven months 
had elapsed between the plaintiff's majority and the fil-
ing of his complaint, the action was barred by the two 
year limitation. The judgment of non-suit was affirmed. 
This decision would seem to dispose also of the con-
tention made that the statute of limitations applicable 
to fraud cases (Defendant's Brief, p. 11) or that ap-
plicable to contract cases (Brief, p. 12) is controlling. 
The rather parenthetical contention that perhaps 
the law of Wyoming governs this case since the "con-
tract" was made there, is contradicted by defendant's 
own Amended Counterclailn, wherein she stated that 
plaintiff, Dr. R. B. Lindsay, is and was at the time of 
said accident, a licensed and practicing physician in 
Montpelier, Idaho, and the defendant :Mary Jane Wood-
ward, employed the plaintiff Dr. R. B. Lindsay, as such 
on or about the 8th day of June, 1952, at said place, 
(Emphasis added). 
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POINT III. 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER 
DEFENDANT'S AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM BEoCAUSE 
THE COUNTERCLAIM EXCEEDED THE JURISDICTION 
OF THE CITY COURT OF SALT LAKE .CITY, AND THERE-
FORE EXCEEDED THE JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT ON APPEAL. 
This defense w.as first raised by Motion to Dismiss, 
which Motion, after argument, was denied. No argument 
was made upon this point at the ti1ne of hearing the Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment, since, as was explained to 
the court, the matter had previously been submitted in 
a former hearing. This defense, however, was reasserted, 
since under the .authority of Burt & Car.lquist Co. v. 
Marks, et al, 53 Utah 'l7, 177 P. 224 (1918), this defense 
can be waived by failure to assert at each opportunity. 
Plaintiff desires, therefore, to present briefly at 
this time the authorities in support of this contention. 
Plaintiff believes matters of jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter of an action ought to be considered by ap-
pellate courts at all stages of the proceedings. 
It will be recalled that defendant in the instant case 
appealed to the District Court after judgment had been 
entered against her by the City Court of Salt Lake City 
in the amount of $268.83, due for services rendered. After 
the appeal was filed, the counterclaim of $40,000.00 was 
asserted by defendant, although she had not even entered 
an appearance in the City Court case. 
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In Hardy v. Meadows, et al, 71 Utah 255, 264 P. 
968 (1928), llubbard, a doctor practicing in Carbon 
County, operated upon Meadows for appendicitis. Mea-
dows shortly thereafter moved to Salt Lake City. In 
November, 1925, Meadows brought suit in the District 
Court in Carbon County against Dr. Hubbard for $5,750.-
00 damages for malpractice, which suit was later dis-
missed. An answer was filed in this case. In the mean-
tirne Hubbard assigned his claim for $125.00 for pro-
fessional services to Hardy, who brought suit on April 
1, 1926, in the City C.-)urt of Salt Lake City for $125.00. 
On April 21, Meadows appe.ared and obtained the order 
interpleading Dr. Hubbard. A counterclaim was there-
upon filed against Dr. Hubbard for $5,750.00 damages. 
Hubbard filed a demurrer on the ground that the coun-
terclaint was not pleadable as a counterclaim in the ac-
tion and that the City Court did not have jurisdiction of 
the subject n1atter of the counterclai1n nor of the cause 
of action therein alleged. This demurrer was overruled 
and Hubbard then answered denying negligence. 
At the trial before the Cit~· Court judgment was 
rendered for Me.adows for $87 4.99 against Hubbard. This 
judgment was appealed to the District Court of Salt Lake 
County. 
When the case wa~ set for trial before the Dis-
trict Court of Salt Lake County, Hubbard urged by 
motion that the City Court had no jurisdiction of the 
subject utatter of the counterclahn and that therefore 
;j 
ft 
I 
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the District Court did not acquire jurisdiction by the 
appeal, except to set aside the judgment of the City Court 
and to dismiss the action. The motion was overruled and 
the District Court proceeded to trial before a jury. 
During the trial, but before submission of the cause, 
:Meadows amended his counterclaim by striking the 
figures $5,750.00 and inserting in lieu thereof $1,000.00. 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Hardy and 
against l\ieadows for $125.00 and in favor of Meadows 
and against Hubbard for $1,000.00. .Judgment was then 
entered and this appeal taken. 
Meadows contended on appeal that even though the 
City Court did not have jurisdiction of the subject mat-
ter of the counterclaim, the District Court, being a court 
of both appellate and original jurisdiction, had jurisdic-
tion to try the issues to the full extent as set forth in the 
City Court. 
Our Supreme Court observed the jurisdiction of the 
City Court to entertain the counterclaim was timely chal-
lenged by the demurrer and that in the District Court 
also such jurisdiction was again timely challenged. 
The Court said: 
"The effeC't of the holdings in all of these 
cases is that the jurisdiction of the District Court 
of a cause on appeal from a justice's court, or 
from other inferior court is derivative and as 
is held in many other jurisdictions; that if the 
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inferior court had not jurisdiction of the cause 
and of the subject-matter therein presented, the 
district court .acquired no jurisdiction thereof by 
appeal ... 
* * * 
" * * * Whatever may be the rule elsewhere, 
the one declared by and to which this court is 
committed, that when the inferior court is with-
out jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate the sub-
ject-matter of an action commenced therein, the 
district court to which the case is appealed does 
not acquire jurisdiction of the action though the 
district court would have original jurisdiction of 
such subject matter if by an original action such 
jurisdiction is invoked is a wholesome rule and 
one founded on basic principles. 
"The conclusion thus reached by us is that 
since the City Court did not have jurisdiction of 
the subject matter presented by the counterclaim, 
the District Court, by appeal, did not acquire nor 
w:as it vested with jurisdiction to hear or try the 
counterclaim on 1nerits, and the judgment ren-
dered on the counterclaim by the City Court and 
· the District Court are nullities and should be 
vacated." 
The case was remanded to the District Court with 
directions that judg1nent be rendered in accordance with 
the decision. 
The rule that a eourt of general jurisdiction h~ 
only the jurisdiction of the inferior court when a matter 
is heard on appeal dates back to the earliest reported 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
decisions in the western states. For example, see Wag-
staff v. Challiss (Kansas, 1884) 1 P. 631. 
This is the rule in Idaho. In Albinola v. Horning, 
et al (Idaho, 1924), 227 P. 1054, an action was begun in 
a justice's court to r8cover $288.00 due from defendant 
to plaintiff on account of a sale of stock. Defendant 
denied the allegations of the complaint, and upon trial, 
judgment went for the plaintiff; the defendant appealed 
to the District Court. 
In the District Court, the defendant amended its 
answer .and filed a cross-complaint, seeking $950.00 on 
account of a fraudulent conveyance of the stock, that 
sum being the amount paid plaintiff for the repurchase 
of the corporation's own stock. Plaintiff demurred to 
the cross-complaint and the den1urrer was overruled. 
Upon motion of the defendant for judgment upon the 
pleadings, judgment was entered for the defendant and 
against the plaintiff in the amount of $1,141.05. The 
plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho, alleg-
ing that the District Court committed error in that it was 
without jurisdiction of the cross-complaint and that the 
judgment w.as in excess of the jurisdiction of the justiee 
court. 
The Court said: 
"In this state the jurisdiction of the district 
court on appeal from a justice court is purely de-
rivative, and, if the justice had no jurisdiction in 
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the purpose of expediting procedure and obviat-
ing trials where no genuine issue of fact exists." 
Ulibarri v. Christenson (Utah, 1954) 275 P. (2d) 
170. 
Under the undisputed facts appearing from the re-
cord in this case, defendant has fully settled and com-
promised the claim which she now asserts ; this claim iR 
barred by limitation; and the District Court is with-
out jurisdiction to hear and determine it. This being 
so, the District Court properly granted plaintiff's Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment upon the issues raised by 
defendant's counterclaim. That judgment ought to be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HAROLD G .. CHRISTENSEN 
JOHN H. SNOW 
.Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
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